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Target detection performance is known to be influenced by events in the previous
trials. It has not been clear, however, whether this bias effect is due to the previous
sensory stimulus, motor response, or decision. Also it remains open whether or
not the previous trial effect emerges via the same mechanism as the effect of
knowledge about the target probability. In the present study, we asked normal human
subjects to make a decision about the presence or absence of a visual target.
We presented a pre-cue indicating the target probability before the stimulus, and
also a decision-response mapping cue after the stimulus so as to tease apart the
effect of decision from that of motor response. We found that the target detection
performance was significantly affected by the probability cue in the current trial
and also by the decision in the previous trial. While the information about the
target probability modulated the decision criteria, the previous decision modulated
the sensitivity to target-relevant sensory signals (d-prime). Using functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI), we also found that activation in the left intraparietal sulcus
(IPS) was decreased when the probability cue indicated a high probability of the
target. By contrast, activation in the right inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) was increased
when the subjects made a target-present decision in the previous trial, but this
change was observed specifically when the target was present in the current trial.
Activation in these regions was associated with individual-difference in the decision
computation parameters. We argue that the previous decision biases the target
detection performance by modulating the processing of target-selective information, and
this mechanism is distinct from modulation of decision criteria due to expectation of a
target.
Keywords: sensory detection, probability cue, decision history, functional magnetic resonance imaging, signal
detection theory, prefrontal cortex
Introduction
Our decision about a sensory stimulus is known to be biased by the probabilistic information
about the stimulus. Experimentally, the information can be given by presenting a pre-cue explicitly
indicating the probability about which stimulus would appear on that trial (Forstmann et al.,
2010; Rahnev et al., 2011; Mulder et al., 2012; Rao et al., 2012; Wyart et al., 2012; d’Acremont
et al., 2013). The probabilistic information can also be obtained through experience of a sufficient
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number of trials (Carterette et al., 1965; Biederman and Zachary,
1970; Carpenter and Williams, 1995; Platt and Glimcher, 1999;
den Ouden et al., 2010; Domenech and Dreher, 2010; Hanks
et al., 2011; Turner et al., 2011). The expectation or knowledge
about the likelihood of a given stimulus is shown to bias the
decision performance through modulation of the distance to a
decision criteria (Carpenter and Williams, 1995; Domenech and
Dreher, 2010; Forstmann et al., 2010; Rahnev et al., 2011; Turner
et al., 2011; Mulder et al., 2012; Rao et al., 2012; Wyart et al.,
2012).
In addition to the stimulus probability, the sensory
discrimination or detection performance is also shown to
be biased by the subjects’ choice responses in the preceding trials
(Verplanck et al., 1952; Bertelson, 1965; Treisman and Williams,
1984; Maloney et al., 2005; Gold et al., 2008; Liston and Stone,
2008; Bode et al., 2012). The previous choice has been shown to
bias the subsequent performance by changing the distance to the
decision threshold as in the effect of probabilistic information
(Treisman and Williams, 1984; Maloney et al., 2005; Gold et al.,
2008; Bode et al., 2012). The mechanism of the biasing effect
of the previous choice remains open, however, because in a
conventional sensory discrimination task, a stimulus presented,
a decision made about the stimulus, and a motor response
associated with the decision have one-to-one correspondence,
and it is not clear if the previous choice effect is due to the
previous stimulus, decision or motor response. Also there are
studies suggesting that the previous choice affects the processing
of sensory information (Treisman and Williams, 1984; Fecteau
et al., 2004; Liston and Stone, 2008), and thus it remains open
whether or not the previous choice effect is mediated by the
same mechanism as the effect of knowledge about the target
probability.
In the present study, we used a target detection task with a
pre-cue indicating the probability of the presence of a target.
We also presented a decision-response mapping cue after the
stimulus and changed the relationship between a decision and
response from trial to trial. The procedure allowed us to tease
apart the effects of stimulus, decision, and response histories, and
also allowed us to examine the effects of probability cue and trial
history separately. Based on the signal detection theory (Green
and Swets, 1966; MacMillan and Creelman, 2005) and brain
activation data, we argue for distinct mechanisms of decision bias
due to a decision in the previous trial and prior knowledge about
the target probability.
Materials and Methods
Subjects
Nineteen normal, right-handed volunteers (10 females; age:
21–44) participated in the experiments. All subjects gave
written informed consent to participate in this study. The
study was approved by the ethics committees of the Graduate
School of Medicine, the University of Tokyo and the Brain
Science Institute, Tamagawa University. The data from three
subjects were discarded because of excessive head movements
during the functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
experiment.
Behavioral Task
Subjects performed a visual detection task for a specific direction
of motion (Figure 1). A trial started with a probability cue
presented at the center of the screen. The cue was a rectangle
(0.6 × 3.0◦) with its bottom colored in green and its top colored
in magenta. The percentage of the green shading relative to the
entire rectangle indicated the probability that a motion stimulus
would appear on that trial. We used two types of cue, Cue-High
and Cue-Low, which indicated the target probability of 67 and
33%, respectively. On half of the trials, Cue-High was presented,
and on the other half Cue-Low was presented. The actual
probability of target presentation accorded with the cue. Subjects
were explicitly instructed tomake use of the probability cue when
making a decision. Subjects were also explicitly indicated the
actual correspondence between the cue and the target probability.
The probability cue was presented for 1 s, followed by a blank
screen of 2 s. Subjects were then shown a horizontally oriented
Gabor stimulus (a sine wave grating of 1.33 cycles/degree of
visual angle, enclosed within a Gaussian envelope with a full
width at half maximum of 2.3 degree) embedded in white noise.
On half of the trials, the sine wave grating moved downwards
at a speed of 5.0 degree/s (Target (+)), and on the other half
the grating did not move (Target (−)). The target presentation
was also in accordance with the type of cue; the probability of
target presence was 67% on trials after presentation of Cue-High,
and the probability of target presence was 33% on trials after
presentation of Cue-Low. Subjects indicated the decision in a
two-step procedure: Subjects first reported the completion of
the decision making by pressing the two buttons simultaneously
using both the index and middle fingers of the right hand.
This report had to be made within 1.5 s of the Gabor stimulus
onset, upon which the stimulus disappeared. Reaction time was
defined as the time between appearance of the grating and the
simultaneous press of two buttons for reporting the completion
of the decision making. Then at 1.5 s after the onset of the
Gabor stimulus, a decision-response mapping cue appeared and
subjects reported their decision about the presence or absence
of motion by pressing one of the two buttons. The mapping
cue consisted of a green letter ‘‘Y’’ (indicating ‘‘yes’’) and a
magenta letter ‘‘N’’ (indicating ‘‘no’’) presented on either side
of the central crosshair. The mapping cue remained on the
screen for 1 s, and upon its disappearance subjects pressed a
button on the side of a letter Y when they thought that the
target was present (Gabor stimulus moving downward; Decision
(+)), and pressed a button on the side of a letter N when
they thought that the target was absent (Gabor stimulus not
moving; Decision (−)). They used the index finger of the right
hand for the right-side button press, and used the middle finger
for the left-side button press. The letters ‘‘Y’’ and ‘‘N’’ can
be presented on the left and right, respectively, or vice versa,
and this letter-position relationship changed from trial to trial
in a pseudorandom manner: Thus the subject used either the
right index or middle finger for reporting the same decision
on roughly 50% of the probability. This procedure allowed us
to dissociate the decision making from motor preparation and
execution processes. It also allowed us to dissociate the bias
effect due to the previous decision from the bias effect due to
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 2 May 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 261
Kaneko and Sakai Decision history bias
FIGURE 1 | Behavioral task. Subjects made a decision about the
presence or absence of downward motion of sine-wave gratings (target)
in a noisy background. The probability of the presence of a target was
informed by the height of the green bar in a probability cue (Cue-High
(66.7%) or Cue-Low (33.3%)) which was presented before a stimulus.
Subjects then observed a Gabor stimulus and reported completion of
their internal decision by pressing two buttons simultaneously. Then a
decision-response mapping cue appeared, and subjects reported their
decision by pressing one of the two buttons (Y for target-present
decision, and N for target-absent decision).
previous motor response. No performance feedback was given
on each trial, but at the end of an experimental session the
correct rate of the decisions in that session was presented on the
screen.
Each session consisted of 49 trials. An interval between the
second button press (report on the presence or absence of
motion) in a given trial and the onset of the probability cue for
the next trial was randomly chosen from 4, 6, and 8 s and one
session lasted for about 9 min. Throughout the session, subjects
were instructed to fixate a white crosshair presented at the center
of the screen. Subjects took part in eight sessions.
To determine the trial order in each session, trials with
a high or low probability cue (Cue-High and Cue-Low) and
trials with or without a target motion stimulus (Target (+)
and Target (−)) were given pseudo-randomly within each
session such that each trial type appeared equally often. Also,
the order of trial types within each session was determined
such that each combination of the probability cue and target
type was preceded equally often by trials with high and low
probability cue and also equally often by trials with and without
a target.
Before the fMRI experiment, each subject took part in 3–4
training sessions, 60 trials for each session. During the training
sessions except for the last one, subjects were given feedback
about the accuracy of their performance on a trial-by-trial basis.
In the last training session we used a two-up, one-down staircase
procedure (Levitt, 1971) to determine the optimal contrast of the
Gabor stimulus for each subject. The contrast was chosen for
each subject so as to yield a correct rate of roughly 70%.
Behavioral Data Analysis
We first identified the factors in the current and previous
trials that influenced the target detection performance. We
performed a multilevel binary logistic regression analysis with
decision type (Decision (+) and (−)) as a dependent variable.
As the first-level predictors, we included cue type in the
previous trial (prev-Cue-High and -Low), target type in the
previous trial (prev-Target (+) and (−)), previous decision
(prev-Decision (+) and (−)), as well as current cue type (Cue-
High and -Low) and current target type (Target (+) and
(−)). Subject factor was included as the second-level predictor.
Factors that significantly affected the decision were identified
using backward elimination procedure based on the quasi-
likelihood under the independance model information criterion
(Pan, 2001), which is a refined version of Akaike’s information
criterion. Removal testing was based on the probability of
the Wald statistic (Bursac et al., 2008). The analysis revealed
that previous decision (prev-Decision), current cue (Cue), and
current target (Target) significantly affected the decision on the
current trial.
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We then conducted a three-way repeated-measures ANOVA
on the probability of reporting the target presence, with Target,
Cue and prev-Decision as within-subject factors. We also
examined the effect of target, probability cue and previous
decision on the time taken to make a decision. The decision
time was defined as the difference between the onset of a Gabor
stimulus and simultaneous press of two buttons for reporting the
completion of a decision.
Analysis Based on Signal Detection Theory
We next used the signal detection theory and examined how
the probabilistic cue and previous decision affected the target
detection process. For each combination of Cue (High and Low)
and prev-Decision ((+) and (−)), we calculated an index of
sensitivity d′ and that of decision criteria c according to the
following equations (Green and Swets, 1966; MacMillan and
Creelman, 2005).
d′ = z(HR)− z(FAR),
c = −(z(HR)+ z(FAR))/2,
where z indicates an inverse of the cumulative normal
distribution, and HR and FAR indicate the hit rate and
false alarm rate, respectively. We conducted two-way repeated
measures ANOVA with factors of Cue and prev-Decision,
separately for d′ and c.
fMRI Data Acquisition
Imaging was performed using a three tesla scanner
(MAGNETOM Trio A Tim; Siemens, Germany). The
functional images of 310 volumes sensitive to blood oxygen
level-dependent (BOLD) contrasts were acquired in each
session by T2∗-weighted echo planar imaging (repetition time
(TR), 2.1 s; echo time (TE), 25 ms; in-plane resolution of
3 mm in 64 × 64 matrix; 35 slices; slice thickness of 3 mm;
interslice gap 1 mm). The onset of each trial relative to the
preceding image acquisition was jittered in steps of 500 ms
within 1 TR (2.1 s). High-resolution structural T1-weighted
magnetization-prepared rapid-acquisition gradient echo images
(TR, 2.0 s; TE, 1.97 ms; inversion time, 900 ms; voxel size
of 1 × 1 × 1.5 mm; 192 slices) were also acquired for all
subjects.
fMRI Data Preprocessing
We used SPM81 for preprocessing and analysis of the image
data. The first five volumes of the images in each session
were discarded to allow for T1 equilibration. The remaining
image volumes were realigned to the first image, corrected
for differences in slice acquisition timing, and normalized
to the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) reference brain
using a 12-parameter affine transformation along with a
nonlinear transformation using cosine basis functions. The
images were resampled into 2 mm cubic voxels and spatially
smoothed with a Gaussian kernel (8 mm, full-width at half
maximum).
1http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm
The preprocessed image data were analyzed using a general
linear model (GLM). For each combination of decision type
(Decision (+) and (−)), target type (Target (+) and (−)),
probability cue type (Cue-High or -Low), and previous decision
type (prev-Decision (+) and (−)), transient activation during
presentation of a Gabor stimulus was modeled as a mini-
epoch with its onset time-locked to the onset of the stimulus
and with its duration matched to the length of the stimulus
presentation. We confirmed that all sixteen regressors used
for modeling activation in this period were orthogonal each
other. Transient activation during presentation of a probability
cue was also modeled as a mini-epoch with its onset time-
locked to the presentation of a probability cue and with its
durationmatched to the length of the cue presentation. The GLM
also included a covariate for transient activation in response
to presentation of the finger mapping cue for all trial types.
Trials with no response to either a Gabor stimulus or decision-
response mapping cue were modeled separately but conjointly
for all the conditions as covariates of no interest. Activation
during trials with no response was modeled as an epoch with
its onset time-locked to the presentation of the probability cue
and with duration matched to the length of trial. Head-motion
parameters in six dimensions were also included in the model
to remove head motion artifacts. All epochs and events were
convolved with a canonical hemodynamic response function.
The data were high-pass filtered with a cutoff frequency of
0.01 Hz.
Identification of Brain Regions Associated With
Decision Bias
We first tried to identify the regions in which activation
during presentation of a probability cue was influenced by
the cue type, but no region showed significant modulation of
activation. Thus our analysis was focused on activation during
presentation of a Gabor stimulus. We were specifically interested
in the effects of Cue and prev-Decision, and their interactions
with Target. Statistical parametric maps of t-statistics were
calculated for condition-specific effects within the GLM. Images
of parameter estimates for the contrast of interest were created
for each subject (first-level analysis) and were then entered
into a second-level analysis using a one-sample t-test across
the 16 subjects. Statistical inferences were made based on a
peak threshold of p < 0.001 uncorrected at a voxel level
and a cluster-size threshold of p < 0.05 corrected for the
whole brain. We used Monte Carlo simulation to determine
the number of contiguous voxels to achieve the corrected
significance level (Forman et al., 1995; Slotnick et al., 2003).
Simulations were performed for 1, 000 times, and the minimum
cluster size that yielded p < 0.05 corrected was 11 contiguous
voxels.
For the activation of the regions identified above, we
conducted ANOVA with factors of prev-Decision, Cue, and
Target. To this end, for each subject, the peak activation was
searched within the spherical region with a radius of 8 mm
centered at the group-level peak identified above. A percent
signal change relative to the inter-trial interval was calculated
separately for each of the prev-Decision, Cue, and Target types.
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Correlation of Activation With Decision
Computation Parameters
We then examined whether or not the activation in regions
associated with Cue and prev-Decision covaried with inter-
individual difference in c and d′. Based on the behavioral data,
we found that c was significantly higher for Cue-Low than on
Cue-High trials. We considered that the regions associated with
regulation of c should show an increase in activation on Cue-
Low than on Cue-High trials, and that subjects who show a larger
change in c depending on Cue types should show a larger increase
in activation on Cue -Low than on Cue-High trials. Thus the
effect size of Cue on regional activation (differential activation
(Diff act)), and the difference in c value between Cue-Low trials
and Cue-High trials (differential decision criteria (Diff c)) were
calculated for individual subject. The linear correlation between
Diff act and Diff c was tested using the Pearson’s R correlation
test.
We also found that d′ was significantly higher for prev-
Decision (+) than on prev-Decision (−) trials. We considered
that the regions associated with regulation of d′ should show
an increase in activation on prev-Decision (+) than on prev-
Decision (−) trials. We tested the significance of linear
correlation between the effect size of prev-Decision on regional
activation (differential activation (Diff act)) and the difference
in d′ value between prev-Decision (+) and (−) trials (differential
d-prime (Diff d′)).
Results
Effect of Probabilistic Cue and Previous Decision
on Behavior
We conducted a multilevel logistic regression analysis in
order to identify the factors in the previous and current
trials that affect sensory detection performance. We first fitted
the full model to the behavioral data with factors of prev-
Cue, prev-Target, prev-Decision, Cue, and Target, and then
tested the change in model fitting after removal of each
factor. We found that removal of either prev-Cue or prev-
Target factor did not significantly decrease the fitting of the
model (prev-Cue: Wald χ2 = 19.6; p = 0.239; prev-Target:
Wald χ2 = 18.7, p = 0.282), indicating that these factors
do not contribute to the detection performance. By contrast,
removal of either the prev-Decision, Cue, or Target factor
significantly decreased the fitting of the model (Wald χ2 =
452.2, 236.4, and 36.3; p < 0.001, < 0.001, = 0.003, respectively).
Thus Cue, Target, and prev-Decision are the main factors
that contribute to the target detection performance. We also
tested a model in which cue, target, and decision in the
second trial before the current one (n-2th trial) were added,
but addition of these factors did not improve the fitting
significantly.
We then examined the effect of Target (+ or), Cue (High or
Low), and prev-Decision (+ or) on the probability of making the
‘‘target present’’ decision (Decision (+) probability). As expected,
there was a significant main effect of Target (F(1,15) = 97.4, p <
0.001): The Decision (+) probability was significantly larger on
FIGURE 2 | Behavioral data. (A) Probability of making a target-present
decision (% Decision (+)). The data are shown separately for Target (+) and (−)
trials, and for each Cue and prev-Decision type. Mean and SE across subjects
(n = 16). (B) Reaction time. The data are shown separately for the eight
conditions based on Cue, Target, and prev-Decision (prev-Dec) type. Mean
and SE across subjects (n = 16). (C) Sensitivity index d′ and criterion index c.
The data are shown separately for the four conditions based on Cue and
prev-Decision types. Mean and SE across subjects (n = 16).
Target (+) trials than on Target (−) trials (Figure 2A). The main
effect of Cue was also significant (F(1,15) = 35.4, p < 0.001): The
Decision (+) probability was significantly larger on Cue-High
trials than on Cue-Low trials, indicating that the subjects made
use of the Cue information. The interaction between Cue and
Target, however, was not significant (F(1,15) = 1.73, p = 0.208),
suggesting that the effect of probability cue does not depend on
the presence or absence of Target.
Concerning the effect of Prev-Decision, by contrast, there
was only a non-significant trend for the main effect of Prev-
Decision (F(1,15) = 3.39, p = 0.086). Unlike the effect of Cue,
the interaction between Prev-Decision and Target was significant
(F(1,15) = 13.7, p = 0.002): On Target (+) trials, Decision (+)
probability was larger in prev-Decision (+) trials than in prev-
Decision (−) trials (p = 0.003), whereas on Target (−) trials, prev-
Decision did not affect the Decision (+) probability significantly
(p = 0.521). The result suggests that unlike probabilistic cue, the
decision on the previous trial biases the decision process only
when the target is present on the current trial. The interaction
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between Cue and prev-Decision was not significant (F(1,15) =
0.523, p = 0.481), suggesting that the two factors may affect
the decision process through different mechanisms. The three
way interaction between Target, Cue and prev-Decision was not
significant (F(1,15) = 0.777, p = 0.392).
We also examined the effect of Target, Cue, and prev-Decision
on the RT (Figure 2B). There was significant interaction between
Target and Cue (F(1,15) = 9.36, p = 0.008), without significant
main effect of Target and Cue (F(1,15) = 3.30, p = 0.089; and
F(1,15) = 1.05, p = 0.322). When target was present, the RT
was smaller when Cue indicated high probability of target
presence than when it indicated low probability, whereas when
target was absent, the RT was larger when Cue indicated
high probability of target presence than when it indicated
low probability. The result is consistent with the idea that
an increase in RT reflects conflict between the probabilistic
information indicated by the cue and actual target presence.
Concerning the decision on the previous trial, neither the main
effect of prev-Decision nor its interaction with Target was
significant (F(1,15) = 0.0504, p = 0.489; and F(1,15) = 1.90, p =
0.188).
Effect on Decision Computation Parameters
We used signal detection theory to quantify the effects of Cue
and prev-Decision on subjects’ perceptual decisions (Green and
Swets, 1966; MacMillan and Creelman, 2005). For each subject,
d′ was calculated as an index of target sensitivity and c was
calculated as an index of detection criterion. With respect to
d′ we found a significant main effect of prev-Decision (F(1,15)
= 15.7, p = 0.001) but neither the main effect of Cue (F(1,15) =
2.75, p = 0.118) nor an interaction effect between Cue and prev-
Decision (F(1,15) = 0.611, p = 0.446) was significant (Figure 2C
left). d′ was significantly larger when subjects reported that the
target was present on the previous trial (prev-Decision (+)) than
when they did not. Concerning c on the other hand, we found
a significant main effect of Cue (F(1,15) = 35.4, p < 0.001), but
neither the main effect of prev-Decision (F(1,15) = 2.62, p =
0.126) nor an interaction effect between Cue and prev-Decision
(F(1,15) = 0.211, p = 0.653) was significant (Figure 2C right).
C was significantly larger when the cue on the current trial
indicated low probability of target presence (Cue-Low) than
when it indicated high probability (Cue-High). The result also
suggests a difference in the mechanism by which Cue and prev-
Decision affect the decision making process.
Effect of Probabilistic Information and Previous
Decision on Regional Activation
According to the behavioral data showing significant main effect
of Cue on the decision process, we first identified regions in
which activation differed between Cue-Low and Cue-High trials.
We found that a region in the left intraparietal sulcus (IPS) was
significantly more active on Cue-Low than on Cue-High trials
(Figure 3A, Table 1). On the activity in this region, both themain
effect of Prev-Decision and that of Target were not significant
(F(1,15) = 0.076, p = 0.786; F(1,15) = 0.116, p = 0.739). The Cue
effect did not interact either with the effect of prev-Decision or
that of Target (F(1,15) = 0.517, p = 0.483; F(1,15) = 3.519, p =
0.080).
We next examined the effect of prev-Decision. We found
that a region around the right inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) was
significantly more active on prev-Decision (+) trials than on
prev-Decision (−) trials (Figure 3B, Table 1). Region-of-interest
analysis additionally showed that there was also a significant
main effect of Target (F(1,15) = 12.16, p = 0.003). The main effect
of Cue, on the other hand, was not significant (F(1,15) = 0.188,
p = 0.671). The interaction between Prev-Decision and Target
was significant (F(1,15) = 15.54, p = 0.001) with larger activity on
Target (+) than on Target (−) trials for prev-Decision (+) (simple
main effect, F(1,15) = 40.01, p = 0.001), but no difference between
Target (+) and Target (−) trials for prev-Decision (−) (simple
main effect, F(1,15) = 0.10, p = 0.760). The interaction between
Cue and prev-Decision, and that of Cue and Target were not
significant (F(1,15) = 0.007, p = 0.934; F(1,15) = 0.279, p = 0.605).
Other regions showing a significant Prev-Decision effect were the
right IPS and ventral occipital cortex (vOC; Table 1). Regions
around the right IPS and vOC were significantly more active on
prev-Decision (+) trials than on prev-Decision (−) trials. Region-
of-interest analysis, on the other hand, showed that there was no
significant effect of Target (right IPS, F(1,15) = 0.472, p = 0.503;
vOC, F(1,15) = 0.077, p = 0.786) nor Cue (right IPS, F(1,15) =
0.585, p = 0.456; vOC, F(1,15) = 2.149, p = 0.163). The interaction
between Cue and prev-Decision (right IPS, F(1,15) = 1.052, p =
0.321; vOC, F(1,15) = 0.105, p = 0.750), and that of Cue and Target
(right IPS, F(1,15) = 0.077, p = 0.785; vOC, F(1,15) = 2.163, p =
0.162) were also insignificant.
In addition, we found that a region in the right middle frontal
gyrus (MFG) showed a significant interaction between Prev-
Decision and Target (Figure 3C, Table 1). For the activity at the
individual peak in this region, however, there was no significant
main effect of Prev-Decision nor that of Target (F(1,15) = 3.452, p
= 0.083; F(1,15) = 0.073, p = 0.791). The Cue effect in this region
was not significant, either (F(1,15) = 1.098, p = 0.311). Interaction
between prev-Decision and Target was also found in a region
in the right parietal operculum (Table 1). For the activity at the
individual peak in this region, there was a significant main effect
of Prev-Decision (F(1,15) = 5.655, p = 0.031). On the other hand,
there was no significant main effect of Target nor that of Cue
(F(1,15) = 0.792, p = 0.388; F(1,15) = 0.371, p = 0.552).
Across-Subject Correlation Between Decision
Parameter and Brain Activation
We next examined whether or not the activation in regions
identified in the previous section was modulated according to
the change in decision computation parameters. To this end,
we tested the significance of linear correlation between the
effect size of Cue on the left IPS activation and the difference
in decision criteria, c, between Cue-Low and Cue-High trials
across 16 subjects. We found significant correlation between
the differential IPS activation and differential decision criteria
(Pearson’s correlation coefficient: 0.601, p = 0.014, N = 16;
Figure 4A).
Concerning the association between the right IFG activation,
on the other hand, there was significant correlation between
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FIGURE 3 | Activation during presentation of the Gabor stimulus.
(A) Activation in the left intraparietal sulcus (IPS) showing a significant
main effect of Cue. Left: The mean activation of the
group-mean-peak-voxel is indicated by a cross-hair (MNI coordinate:
−33, −61, 58). Right: The percent signal change is plotted for each
Cue, Target, and prev-Decision (prev-Dec) type. Mean and SE across
subjects (n = 16). (B) Activation in the right inferior frontal gyrus (IFG)
(peak MNI coordinate: 48, 2, 28) showing a significant main effect of
prev-Decision. The format is the same as (A). (C) Activation in the right
middle frontal gyrus (MFG) (peak MNI coordinate: 39, 50, 25) showing a
significant interaction between prev-Decision and Target. The format is
the same as (A).
the effect size of prev-Decision and the difference in decision
sensitivity, d′, between Prev-Decision (+) and Prev-Decision (−)
trials (Pearson’s correlation coefficient: 0.590, p = 0.016, N = 16;
Figure 4B).
Discussion
We have compared the effect of prior information about target
probability and that of previous trial on a visual detection
performance. We have also decomposed the previous trial effect
into stimulus, decision and response factors. We found that at
least within the context of target detection for an ambiguous
visual stimulus, the behavior was significantly biased by the
probabilistic information about the target in the current trial and
decision in the previous trial. While the probability cue affected
the detection performance regardless of the presence or absence
of the target, the previous decision affected the performance
only when the target was present on the current trial. The
effects of probability cue and previous decision did not interact,
suggesting independent mechanisms between the two factors.
The dissociation between the probability cue effect and previous
decision effect is observed in decision computation parameters
and brain activation data, suggesting separate mechanisms
between the two.
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TABLE 1 | Areas with activation during presentation of the Gabor stimulus.
Area Side Coordinates T-value Cluster size (voxels)
Main effect of Cue
∗ IPS Left −33, −61, 58 4.40 12
Main effect of prev-Decision
∗ IFG Right 48, 2, 28 6.79 42
IPS Right 27, −58, 40 6.11 24
vOC Right 36, −76, −8 4.98 13
Interaction between prev-Decision and Target
∗MFG Right 39, 50, 25 5.09 22
POp Right 60, −13, 13 4.25 13
IPS: intraparietal slcus, IFG: inferior frontal gyrus, vOC: ventral occipital cortex, MFG: middle frontal gyrus, POp: parietal operculum.*regions shown in Figure 3.
Distinct Effects on Decision Performance
The mechanism of the biasing effect due to prior information
about the stimulus probability has been examined fairly
extensively. Regardless of whether the stimulus probability is
given by an external cue or acquired through experience,
the information is shown to bias the perceptual decision by
modulating the decision threshold (Carpenter and Williams,
1995; Domenech and Dreher, 2010; Forstmann et al., 2010;
Rahnev et al., 2011; Turner et al., 2011; Mulder et al., 2012;
Rao et al., 2012). By contrast, the mechanism of the previous
trial effect remains open because it has not been clear if it is
the stimulus, response or decision in the previous trial that
affects the performance in the current trial. In the present
study, by introducing a decision-response mapping cue after
the stimulus, we have been able to dissociate the effect of
decision and response. Also by including cue, stimulus, and
decision in the previous trial as separate factors in a multiple
logistic regression model, we were able to examine the effect
of each factor on target detection performance. We found that
the decision in the previous trial significantly affected the target
detection performance on the current trial. The cue type and
the presence or absence of a target in the previous trial did not
contribute to the history-dependent decision biasing effect.
We also found that the decision biasing effect differed
between the probability cue and previous decision: While the
effect of probability cue was observed regardless of the presence
or absence of a target, the effect of previous decision interacted
with the target factor. When the subjects made decision that the
target was present in the previous trial, they were more likely to
make the same decision in the subsequent target-present trial. By
contrast, the previous decision did not affect the decision process
on a target-absent trial. The results may suggest that the previous
decision affects the processing of target information, whereas
the knowledge about the target probability affects the decision
process other than stimulus processing. This idea is supported by
the analysis using the signal detection theory.
Distinct Effects on Decision Computation
Processes
According to the signal detection theory, decision computation
process can be decomposed into target sensitivity (d′) and
decision criteria (c) (Green and Swets, 1966; Harvey, 1992;
MacMillan and Creelman, 2005). In a target detection task, the
decision variable derives from the target-relevant sensory signal
plus noise (Target (+) trials) or noise alone (Target (−) trials),
and d′ corresponds to the difference in themean decision variable
between Target (+) and (−) trials. The decision variable is then
compared with the decision criteria and a target-positive or
-negative decision is made when the decision variable is above or
below the decision criteria. The influence of the previous decision
on d′ we have observed in the present study together with the
finding that the previous decision influenced the target detection
performance in Target (+) but not in Target (−) trials suggests
that the decision history changes the probability distribution
of the decision variable deriving from target-relevant sensory
signals but not noise.
Previous studies using a sensory discrimination task have
suggested that the choice history influences subsequent choices
either by changing the decision criteria or starting point
of sensory evidence accumulation (Treisman and Williams,
1984; Maloney et al., 2005; Gold et al., 2008; Bode et al.,
2012), but there are also studies suggesting that it does so by
modulating the perceptual sensitivity (Treisman and Williams,
1984; Fecteau et al., 2004; Liston and Stone, 2008). The choice
history effect examined in these studies includes decision and
motor response factors because there was a fixed mapping
between decision category and motor effector with which to
indicate the decision. Here we have removed the effect of
motor response and shown that it is the previous decision
that affects the target detection performance and it does
so mainly by modulating the sensitivity to a target, rather
than by modulating the decision criteria. Recently, Wyart
et al. (2012) have shown dissociation in the effect on visual
detection performance between probabilistic information about
the target and task-relevance of the visual information. In
that study the relevance information was shown to affect the
sensitivity in information processing only for the signal present
trial, similarly to the previous decision effect in the present
study.
By contrast the probabilistic information was shown to
modulate the decision criteria. Unlike the previous decision
effect, the probability cue effect was observed for both Target
(+) and (−) trials suggesting that the probabilistic information
influences perceptual decision by shifting the detection criterion
for both Target (+) and (−) trials to the same degree. The
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FIGURE 4 | Correlations between decision parameter and brain
activation. (A) Differential activation (Diff act) in the left IPS (MNI
coordinate: −33, −61, 58) between Cue-Low and Cue-High trials is
plotted against the differential decision criteria (Diff c). Data are shown
for 16 subjects. (B) Differential activation in the right IFG (MNI
coordinate: 48, 2, 28) between prev-Decision (+) and prev-Decision
(−) trials is plotted against the difference in decision sensitivity
(Diff d′).
finding is consistent with previous studies using the integration-
to-boundmodels (Carpenter andWilliams, 1995; Domenech and
Dreher, 2010; Forstmann et al., 2010; Mulder et al., 2012; Rao
et al., 2012) and studies using the signal detection theory (Rahnev
et al., 2011; Turner et al., 2011). In these studiesmodulation of the
decision criteria or equivalently the starting point of the sensory
evidence accumulation has been observed regardless of whether
the prior information about the target probability is given by
a pre-cue or obtained through experience of sufficient number
of trials.
Dissociation in the Neural Mechanism
The dissociation between the previous decision effect and
probabilistic cue effect was also observed in the pattern of
brain activation. The interaction between previous decision and
target was observed in the MFG, and additionally in the peak
activation of IFG associated with previous decision. However,
the probabilistic cue did not affect the activation in these
regions. Especially the differential activation in IFG depending
on the previous decision was observed only in the Target (+)
trials, which accords with the behavioral performance. The
main effect of probabilistic cue, by contrast, was observed in
the IPS, but the previous decision and target did not affect
the activation in this region. The results suggest separate
neural mechanisms for mediating the biasing effect between
the previous decision and probabilistic information about the
target. The idea is further supported by the association between
activation in these regions and inter-individual difference
in the degree of behavioral biasing effects. Activation in
the right IFG was associated with the behavioral effect of
the previous decision, whereas activation in the left IPS
was associated with the behavioral effect of the probabilistic
information.
Both IFG and IPS are shown to be involved in attention,
but the role of each region seems to be different. While the
IFG is shown to be involved in selection of internal mental
representation (Nobre et al., 2004), the IPS is shown to be
involved in the selection of incoming sensory information
(Chun and Johnson, 2011). It could be that the previous
decision about the presence or absence of a target modulates
the internal representation of a target template in the IFG
and thus selectively affects the performance on Target (+)
trials. The probabilistic information, on the other hand, may
modulate the gain of sensory information processing in the
IPS. Another possibility is that the IFG is a part of the
ventral attention network and is involved in stimulus-driven
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attention, whereas the IPS, which is a part of the dorsal
attention network, is involved in endogenous top-down control
of attention (Corbetta and Shulman, 2002). While the stimulus-
driven attention mechanism in the IFG may be triggered by
the memory of having made a specific decision, the top-
down attention mechanism in the IPS may be modulated
by the explicit knowledge about the likelihood of target
appearance as suggested in a previous study (Wyart et al.,
2012).
Findings from single unit recording studies on monkeys
can also be taken to support the present finding. It has been
shown that the probabilistic information changes the baseline
activity of neurons in the monkey LIP region (equivalent to the
human IPS) (Platt and Glimcher, 1999; Hanks et al., 2011; Rao
et al., 2012), suggesting that probabilistic information modulates
the starting point of the sensory evidence accumulation and
effectively reduces the decision criteria. A decrease in the IPS
activity during a decision period observed in the present imaging
study may reflect an increase in the activity during the pre-
stimulus period. In contrast to the probabilistic information,
the choice history does not affect the activity of LIP neurons
(Gold et al., 2008). Instead, the trial-by-trial change in the
offset of decision variable, which has been shown to reflect the
choice history effect, has also been shown to be correlated with
responsiveness of frontal eye field (FEF) neurons as measured
by oculomotor response induced by microstimulation. In the
present study, activation in the IFG rather than in the FEF may
reflect the fact that a hand motor response was used to indicate
the decision.
Previous human imaging studies have shown that not just
the IPS but a more extensive set of regions are involved in
the biasing effect due to probabilistic information: The regions
include dorsolateral and inferolateral prefrontal cortices, anterior
cingulate cortex, premotor cortex, putamen, and hippocampus,
in addition to parietal regions (denOuden et al., 2010; Domenech
and Dreher, 2010; Forstmann et al., 2010; Rahnev et al., 2011;
d’Acremont et al., 2013). Concerning the effect of previous trials,
there are studies in which activation in the FEF is modulated by
the previous choice (Manoach et al., 2007; Akaishi et al., 2014).
In the present study, we found that activation in the IFG is
associated with previous decision. An interaction between the
previous decision and current target is observed in the MFG
as well as IFG. It could be that activation in a selective set of
regions in the present study is due to the removal of confounding
factors by including multiple factors in the fMRI data analysis
model.
Conceptual Framework of Decision Bias Due to
Prior Information
There are different sorts of prior information such as memory
and expectation of an upcoming stimulus, decision, and
response, and either of them could affect the behavior on
the subsequent trials. The present study has made it clear
that it is the previous decision that affects the subsequent
target detection performance. A recent study has also shown
that the previous decision contributed more to the decision
bias than the previous stimulus or response, and that this
previous decision effect is significantly larger when the decision
has been made on an ambiguous stimulus in the previous
trial than when it was made on a salient stimulus (Akaishi
et al., 2014). When a stimulus is ambiguous, the decision has
to be made based on an endogenous signal, and this signal
may be carried over to the subsequent trial and bias the
decision.
The key finding in the present study is that the previous
decision seems to affect the processing of target-relevant
information. When subjects believed that the target was present
in the previous trial, this belief may facilitate the processing
of target-relevant sensory information and lead to a higher
probability of a target-present decision. When a target is
absent in the subsequent trial, no decision biasing effect
is observed. This may suggest that the effect of previous
decision is specific to the processing of target-relevant sensory
information, and does not modulate the processing of noise.
Such selective modulation seems to be mediated by the
prefrontal region known to be involved in the control of
selective attention (Desimone and Duncan, 1995), and the
finding of IFG and MFG activation associated with previous
decision effect is consistent with the idea. By contrast, the
probabilistic information about the target is less selective;
the biasing effect is observed regardless of the presence or
absence of the target. In contrast to the biasing effect of the
previous decision on on-line processing of target information,
the probabilistic information seems to take effects by adjusting
the decision threshold before the stimulus presentation, and
thus non-selectively affects processing of both target information
and noise.
The dissociation between the previous decision effect
and probability cue effect may reflect the fact that while
the previous decision affects the decision process through
actual commitment of the decision, the probabilistic
information influences the behavior by providing abstract
knowledge about the event occurrence. The dissociation,
however, does not necessarily indicate the independance
between the two mechanisms. Our claim is that under the
context of sensory detection for an ambiguous stimulus,
previous decision plays a major role in biasing the
subsequent decision, and it does so via a mechanism that
differs from the one involved in the decision bias due to
probabilistic information. The interaction between the multiple
decision biasing mechanisms should be explored in future
studies.
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